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I. Introduction   
     As Congress gears up for another round of massive tax cuts whose benefits will primarily go 
to the wealthiest, it might be worthwhile to consider the underlying rationale for these cuts.  
     In general, there are two arguments presented in justification for such cuts. The first is a 
utilitarian argument. The claim is that tax cuts for the wealthy will stimulate the economy and 
make things generally better for everyone. There are many good reasons to think that this is not  
true, but I am going to leave this claim aside for now as it is largely a practical question 
concerning how a capitalist system functions.   
     The more fundamental, and more philosophical, justification comes from the libertarians. The 
libertarian claim is that taxation for any other purpose than the defense of liberty is illegitimate, 
indeed, a kind of theft.  According to the libertarians, the government simply has no right to 
impose taxes for such services as public education, aid to the poor, health care, social security, or 
any other service that does not involve a direct protection from those who might threaten our 
liberty (e.g., criminals or foreign invaders).    
     This libertarian idea has gained a lot of traction in recent decades, even among many who 
would not identify as libertarian. It provides the ideological foundation for the hostility toward 
government fostered by the radical right. I believe it is deeply flawed. The following is my 
attempt to say why.     
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II. The Libertarian Argument 
     Libertarianism is based in the principle that each person has a right to do what he or she likes 
so long as it doesn't interfere with the right of others to do the same. 
     This sounds reasonable enough when one first hears it, which is one reason libertarianism has 
something of an intuitive appeal. Nevertheless, when applied as the libertarians apply it, it has 
alarming, indeed draconian, consequences.   
     Our right to do as we please extends to how we  distribute our property, according to the 
libertarians. We all have a right to do just what we like with our property, share it or not as we 
like, and no one has the right to compel us to do with it what we do not choose. 
     This, according to the libertarians, is an implication of the right to liberty.  
     The sole role of government, in this view, is to protect this right to liberty. Government as 
such  always poses something of a threat to liberty insofar as it employs coercive power to 
enforce its laws. Its right to do so, say the libertarians, is strictly limited by its role as guarantor 
of liberty. In other words, government only has the right to use coercion to defend against those 
who would themselves use coercion to impede liberty. This is the extent of government’s right to 
coerce.  This means that taxation for any other purpose (e.g., to fund public education, health 
care, aid to the poor, etc.) is illegitimate, for it compels the taxpayer to fund services the taxpayer 
may not wish to fund.  Such compelled taxation, say the libertarians, is an affront to liberty and 
amounts to a kind of theft.  
     What is wrong with this argument? 
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III. The Libertarian Flaw 
     The fundamental flaw in libertarian thinking is its failure to take into account the 
interdependent nature of social life and, in particular, how property is acquired, and must be 
acquired, in a settled society. 
     We are all born propertyless. 
     This is as true for the person who eventually becomes a billionaire as it is for the 
impoverished. The only way to acquire property in a settled society, where all the natural 
resources have been divvied up and are already owned by someone, is to acquire it from those 
who already have it. Those who cannot acquire property from those who own it will die. 
     If we now say that property owners have the right to do whatever they like with their property 
– share it or not, hire people or not – this is as much as to say that they have the right to 
determine, at their sole discretion, who, among those who do not yet have property, shall live and 
who shall die, who shall prosper and who shall founder, who shall have the opportunity to fulfill 
their potentialities and whose potentialities shall be quashed. In effect, it is to say that property 
owners have a right to establish a tyranny over everyone else.  
     In other words, to grant that people have the property rights that libertarians claim is to grant 
that some (the propertied) have the right to deprive others of the very things libertarians 
themselves generally claim we all have a right to – life, liberty, and property.  
     But this amounts to a contradiction. By definition, no one can have a right to deprive others of 
those things they have a right to.  
     It follows that there must be a flaw in the libertarian understanding of the right to property – 
and indeed there is. Wherein lies this flaw? To answer this we need to take a closer look at what 
the ‘right to property’ really means.  
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IV. The Right to Property 
     What is ‘property,’ and what can it mean to say that we have a right to it?  
     Perhaps the first thing to point out is that the idea of property is itself a legal concept. This 
can be made clear by distinguishing property from possession. If I steal your car I come into 
possession of it, but it does not thereby become my property. It remains your property even 
though it is no longer in your possession. To say that one has property in something is to say, 
precisely, that he or she has certain rights in respect to it. The right to property, in other words, is 
a right to a certain set of rights.  
     What, then, is a ‘right’? A right, again, is a legal concept. To say that we have a right to 
something is to say that, by law, we have certain entitlements with respect to it; we are permitted, 
by law, to do this or that with regard to it, and others are not permitted to interfere.  
     Given that the idea of a ‘right’ is a legal concept, were we to understand law itself to be 
strictly a political construct, we would have to say that the right to property is just whatever the 
law declares it to be. On this ground, it would be meaningless to declare any kind of taxation 
illegitimate. Insofar as taxation is law, it would, by definition, be legitimate. 
     But this is not how libertarians view law. According to classical liberalism, to which 
libertarians generally appeal, there is a natural law that grants us natural rights. When the 
Declaration of Independence declares that “all men are created equal and are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable rights,” it is to this idea of natural law and natural rights that it  
appeals. Natural law takes precedence over political law. Political law is itself legitimate or not 
to the extent that it conforms to natural law.  
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     Thus, libertarians base their claims, not in a political right to property but in a natural right to 
property. In order to understand just what the natural right to property is, however, we must first 
understand the natural law from which it is said to arise.  
     What is natural law and what sanctions it?  
     This is an involved philosophical question around which there might be much debate.  But if 
we restrict ourselves to the tradition of classical liberalism we find that, according to this 
tradition, natural law is rooted in the principle that all human beings are of equal, fundamental, 
worth and have a basic responsibility to respect each other as such. All natural rights arise from 
this principle.  
     The natural right to property, then, must be understood as rooted in this principle as well. 
According to John Locke, perhaps the foremost proponent of classical liberalism, the natural 
right to property has its basis in the need we all have for the property required for a satisfactory 
life.  As Locke presents it, the earth must be thought of as originally belonging to all humankind 
in common. But individual human beings must be supposed to have a natural right to extract 
property from the earth, for such property is required in order to live. Were there no such right of 
appropriation, writes Locke,  “man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.”1  
     Thus, the natural right to property is, at its base, the right to have access to the property 
needed for a decent life. As such, it is a right as applicable to the propertyless as to the 
propertied.   
     But, as Locke himself notes, this implies that there must be a limit to the amount of property 
any individual – or group of individuals – has a right to do with as they please. Otherwise 
someone, or some group of people, could amass all the available property and deprive everyone 
else of access to it, turning everyone else into their slaves. 
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     Thus, the libertarian understanding of the right to property proves to be gravely flawed; 
indeed, it is itself a threat to liberty. Libertarianism, taken to its logical conclusion, leads to 
plutocracy and tyranny, not liberty.  
 
IV. Conclusion: The Role of Government 
     In a settled society, then, where all the property is already owned, the right to property must 
be understood as entailing the right of those without property to have sufficient access to the 
property they need to live well. Given this, the government's responsibility to protect our rights 
implies its responsibility to so order the economy as to ensure that everyone has access to a 
decent livelihood.  
    Where the free market fails to accomplish this, the government has not only a right, but a 
positive obligation, to tax the propertied so as to provide programs and services that will ensure 
that everyone in society will have sufficient access to the property they need for a satisfactory 
life. 
     This is what the right to property implies, and, indeed, what a free society demands.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, editor, C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1980), sec. 28. 
 
